Darren Olivier.
Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine has resulted in the deaths of thousands of innocent Ukrainian civilians, the destruction of entire cities, and the justified imposition of extraordinary sanctions against Russia.
ON TOP OF THIS, it’s causing severe and dangerous wider global impacts, ranging from wheat shortages, to inflation and economic losses.
For many African air forces, however, there is another major problem as highlighted by Ekene Lionel writing for Military Africa: All three of the countries that provide the vast majority of spare parts for ex-Soviet/Russian aircraft and can service and upgrade them, namely Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, will be unable to provide support to anyone for the foreseeable future because of either sanctions or the war itself.
Russian forces have been systematically destroying the Ukrainian defence industry, hitting aircraft construction, maintenance, and parts production facilities. Russia, in turn, is now under such severe sanctions that it’s unlikely it will be able to maintain a significant level of aircraft or
even aircraft parts production for long.
Belarus may be in the same position soon, being under a similar level of sanctions as Russia. Moreover, even if Russian facilities are able to maintain a high enough level of production, it’s likely most or all will first be reserved for Russian needs, given the losses they have sustained in Ukraine.
While there are other companies in other countries that could pick up some of the slack in terms of maintenance support, they’re still reliant on Russia and Ukraine for parts and components which aren’t made elsewhere. In fact, even Ukraine, which had an enviable domestic industry before the war, and vast experience with former-Eastern Bloc aircraft, was unable to reverse engineer many key parts for its fighter aircraft after it was cut off from Russian purchases in 2014.
‘we will all be affected by the knock-on economic effects’
Instead, it had to covertly acquire the necessary parts via other countries, while cannibalising large numbers of aircraft.
For perhaps a few months the demand could be met by existing parts in supply and a similar type of cannibalisation. But if, as expected, this crisis continues for some time, then African forces operating ex-Soviet, Ukrainian, or Russian aircraft in key roles need to begin making alternative plans now – or face wholesale fleet groundings. These African forces need to be identifying alternative suppliers, locking in as many guarantees as possible, and looking for reverse engineering opportunities, both domestically, and from companies trying to fill the gap. Even if there ends up being no support and supply crisis, perhaps because Russia withdraws and sanctions are lifted, or other countries somehow make up the slack, this will still have been a useful exercise.
This may also affect countries operating Chinese aircraft, as China has yet to replace Russian systems in all areas of its designs, in particular when it comes to modern turbofan fighter aircraft engines. For instance, both the JF-17 and L-15 use Russian-made engines, an RD-93 and a pair of AI-222K-25Fs respectively, though older Chinese fighters like the F-7 use Chinese-made licence-built variants of older Soviet-era turbojets and should be minimally affected.
South Africa will escape the most severe impact, as the South African Air Force does not operate any significant Russian systems, but the future of its students studying in Russian military academies is less certain.
However, we will all be affected by the knock-on economic effects of this war which may in turn have serious political, social, and security implications. Rising food prices driven by a wheat shortage, a high oil price, and the general supply problems of the past two years are already causing discontent in a number of countries. Especially the Middle East and North Africa. It was similar food price hikes and the resulting mass protests that kicked off the Arab Spring a few years ago.
It’s too early to predict whether we will see similar mass protests leading to governments falling and strategic realignments on the continent, but we definitely can’t rule it out. Those may in turn result in shifts in governments, or in government policy, that upend decades-long assumptions regarding the stability of many regions on the continent.
‘entirely dependent on Russian-made aircraft’
Somewhat related, the invasion of Ukraine has had another major impact: Ukraine needing to urgently withdraw its aviation unit from the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The eight Mi-8s and Mi-24s deployed there until the war began represented a full third of MONUSCO’s aviation capability and the most crucial part of its offensive and reconnaissance capabilities as MONUSCO’s dwindling budget meant it could not rely too heavily on the more costly South African Rooivalks deployed.
The UN has already begun casting around for replacement aircraft for the mission, but any replacements are going to take months to arrive in the best case scenario and it’s unlikely that any other country could provide as many aircraft for the same low cost as the Ukrainians could. South Africa certainly cannot provide more Oryx and Rooivalk helicopters to the mission. What impact that has on MONUSCO’s ability to continue keeping overall levels of violence low while combating persistent insurgent groups like the ADF is still unknown, but it will undoubtedly make the task much more difficult.
In terms of countries most dependent on Russian aircraft for their main air defence and combat needs, Algeria is far and away the most vulnerable in North Africa with a combat fleet entirely made up of Russian fighter aircraft, centred around a fleet of nearly 60 Su-30MKAs and three dozen MiG-29M/M2s. Unlike similar Su-30MK variants acquired by India and Malaysia, which have substantial non-Russian systems, the Algerian aircraft are almost entirely dependent on Russian components.
Further south, Angola, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda are all entirely dependent on Russian-made aircraft for all combat roles, putting them in all in a difficult position if support becomes more difficult.
Using Angola as an example, it operates a varied fleet including MiG-21s, Su-27s, Su-25s, MiG-23s, Su-22s, Mi-24s, Mi-8s, and others, but it is primarily reliant on a fleet of 12 Su-30Ks recently upgraded and overhauled by the 558th Aviation Repair Plant in Belarus and 8 Mi-171s, both of which are very dependent on modern Russian components that might soon be in short supply. Counter-intuitively, it will be easier to maintain the Angolan Air Force’s older aircraft, as they rely on more commonly-available parts than either the Su-30K or Mi-171.
Looking beyond the immediate crisis, this provides a useful lesson for why you ideally don’t want to source all of your combat aircraft from the same country, but should rather spread the risk around multiple countries. It also validates the practice of operating at least two separate fighter aircraft types from different countries, though that’s beyond the reach of most countries.
This will also provide new opportunities for Chinese, Turkish, and other countries to further supplant Russian and Ukrainian exports to Africa, as it’s likely most buyers will be hesitant about buying from either of those two for some time to come.
